| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This study focuses on the historical development of judicial election and its recent challenges and reforms in the United States. The main purpose for each state to amend its constitution to introduce judicial election in 1850s was to make the judiciary robust and independent from other political branches rather than to put it under control by the people themselves. However, as modern judicial election has become much more politicized than ever through involvement of various interest groups, it caused widespread national concerns over ensuring the judicial impartiality and fair trial required by due process. In response to such concerns, the U. S. Supreme Court has dealt with the matter and several states have begun to promote the reform of their judicial appointment system. Through evaluating the previous studies of legal history and carrying out the empirical analyses on judicial election, it is revealed that some states try to create a new judicial appointment system in which both contradicted elements of democratic control and fair trial should be harmonized. In addition, it is proved that public confidence or trust in the court is based not only on democratic accountability and transparency of the courts, but also on the general expectation for judicial independence and impartiality, the unique and original role of elected judges different from elected politicians. From the viewpoint of comparative law, this study is suggestive for revisiting the judicial appointment system of the Supreme Court of Japan, which introduces retention election like the merit plan, in relation with the basic propositions of judicial independence and impartiality and public confidence in the court.
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