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 研究課題名(和文) Creative Destruction in the International State System  
  
 研究課題名(英文) Creative Destruction in the International State System  
  
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研究成果の概要(和文)：この研究で、欧州の国境の1000-2000年のデータを用いて、次の分析をしました。  
 1) 1000-1850年の間で、都市の支配者の変更とその都市の成長の短期的・長期的関係(支配者の変更が短期的に成長に悪かったですが、長期的に良かったです。) 2) 戦争に付随する国境の変更と平和的な国境の変更の属性の違い 3) 国際連合安保理の非常任理事国の選挙と制裁実行の関係

#### 研究成果の学術的意義や社会的意義

The relative power of different countries changes over time. Are some changes or configurations particularly likely to lead to war? Is the rise of China likely to lead to military conflict? Based on the last 1000 years of European history, wars are more likely when powers are evenly matched.

研究成果の概要(英文)：This research project focussed mainly on analyzing all changes in European boundaries over roughly the past 1000 years. Our first set of results examined cities that switched control between different European states. The switch was destructive in the short term but in the long term increased the size of the cities as switches tended to be towards more productive states. Our second set of results concerns when territorial transfers between states involve war. Our data shows that the vast majority of these transfers are peaceful. A war is more likely to occur when the sides to the dispute are more evenly matched. This may be because this is when the outcome is uncertain: in cases where the sides are unevenly matched, war will generally not occur because the winner could be predicted in advance. A final aspect of this research project looked at the UN security council. We found that states that were asked to (and did) comply with resolutions were more likely to be elected.

研究分野：政治経済学

キーワード：Balance of power Creative destruction War Alliances

## 1. 研究開始当初の背景

This research project began as a follow up to a study on the structure of insurgency, published as

Trebbi, F. and Weese, E. (2019), *Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures*. *Econometrica*, 87: 463-496.

In that paper we considered whether we could infer the structure of an insurgency based on the structure of their attacks. Our research, however, led us to wonder whether current econometric techniques combined with modern datasets could be used more generally to study war and armed conflict.

## 2. 研究の目的

This research project focused on conflict, particularly looking at European boundaries over the past 1000 years. Ancillary projects examined UN Security Council elections and compliance with sanctions, as well as asymmetric conflict and insurgent learning in Afghanistan. The overall purpose of the project is to understand the causes and effects of armed conflict, one of the most destructive forces in the world today.

## 3. 研究の方法

The main research method used is modern applied econometrics. This analysis was conducted as joint research with a number of coauthors, both international and domestic. These include Francesco Trebbi (University of British Columbia, now moved to UC Berkeley), Austin Wright (University of Chicago), David Schonholzer (Stockholm University), and Johann Caro-Burnett (Hiroshima University)

## 4. 研究成果

Our first results pertain to the (recently ended) destructive asymmetric conflict between the US-supported Afghan government and the Taliban-led insurgency. These results have been published as

Francesco Trebbi, Eric Weese, Austin L. Wright and Andrew Shaver (2020), "Insurgent Learning", *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy*: Vol. 1: No. 3, pp 417-448.

Over the past decade the United States has invested substantial economic resources in protecting its troops against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Yet we know little about the impact of these investments on combat tactics and soldier safety. We introduce a model of insurgent learning where combatants adapt during an asymmetric war using defensive and offensive technological innovation. We test comparative statics of the model using declassified military records on individual IED explosions in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2014. Consistent with insurgent learning, we show that detonation and casualty rates did not decline during this period. This microlevel evidence is also consistent with the qualitative historical record from other substate conflicts. We conclude by decomposing variable input costs for defensive and offensive innovation presented in military documents.

Overall, the findings from this branch of the research project suggest that extraordinary levels of military expenditure on equipment are unable to change the results of combat against an under-resourced but determined and creative adversary.

Another set of results pertain to UN Security Council elections. This is joint research with

Johann Caro-Burnett, and a revision has been requested by the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Standard economic theory would predict that costly demands placed by the United Nations on its members should be rewarded. Similarly, when rewards are not attractive enough, countries are not expected to comply with such demands. In this paper, we study whether the rewards offered by the United Nations are seats at the Security Council. We show empirically that countries that have greater demands placed upon them by Security Council resolutions, are more likely to be elected. Furthermore, although countries comply with resolutions leading up to their election, compliance decreases after they are elected. Finally, we show that countries that have not been in the Security Council recently, and thus are due for election, have additional requests made on them

A third set of results pertain to changes in control of cities in Europe over the past 1000 years. This is joint research with David Schonholzer, and this part of the research project consumed most of the time; however, it is also the part that has been most challenging to publish. We are still revising the following findings in hopes of publishing them in a top economics journal:

Using newly available data on the universe of boundary changes for all European states over 1000-1850, we argue that competition between states leads to short-term losses and long-term gains in economic growth. In event studies, cities switching between states suffer large transitory losses in population but enjoy sustained population increases under new governance. We then use decomposition techniques to show that improvements in state quality occur both due to improvements of the pool of states overtime as well as due to cities gravitating towards higher quality states. Parliamentary activity, fiscal capacity, and protection from predation mediate these effects.

A fourth set of results is unfortunately not yet ready for publication, but consists of an analysis of all boundary changes over the 1000-1950 period in Europe. This boundary data comes from a unique historical atlas produced by Clockwork Mapping in the US, and has not previously been accessible to researchers in economics. We combine this boundary data with data on wars in Europe provided by Peter Brecke, and examine which territorial transfers are most likely to be associated with warfare. Results are not yet final, but in general it appears that warfare is more likely when there are evenly matched sides to a dispute. Additional study is required to link these findings to "Balance of Power" theory: are smaller states deliberately forming alliances and targeting more powerful neighbours? We believe that this is the case, but existing econometric techniques are surprisingly difficult to use with this dataset, and thus we have had to try to develop new techniques. This has substantially delayed progress on this branch of the project.

5. 主な発表論文等

〔雑誌論文〕 計1件（うち査読付論文 1件/うち国際共著 1件/うちオープンアクセス 0件）

1. 著者名 Trebbi Francesco, Weese Eric, Wright Austin L., Shaver Andrew	4. 巻 1
2. 論文標題 Insurgent Learning	5. 発行年 2020年
3. 雑誌名 Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy	6. 最初と最後の頁 417 ~ 448
掲載論文のDOI（デジタルオブジェクト識別子） 10.1561/113.00000013	査読の有無 有
オープンアクセス オープンアクセスではない、又はオープンアクセスが困難	国際共著 該当する

〔学会発表〕 計0件

〔図書〕 計0件

〔産業財産権〕

〔その他〕

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6. 研究組織

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7. 科研費を使用して開催した国際研究集会

〔国際研究集会〕 計0件

8. 本研究に関連して実施した国際共同研究の実施状況

共同研究相手国	相手方研究機関		
スウェーデン	Stockholm University		
米国	UC Berkeley	University of Chicago	