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研究課題名(和文) The Influence of the US and China on the United Nations Secretariat: A Proposal for Institutional Reform

研究課題名(英文) The Influence of the US and China on the United Nations Secretariat: A Proposal for Institutional Reform

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研究成果の概要(和文)：私の研究では、2本の研究論文、複数の学術論文、会議論文、その他プレゼンテーションなどを通じて、国連事務局に対する大国の影響力は相当なものであることを明らかにした。これは、独立した公平な立場にあるはずの役人が、さまざまな手段で影響を受けるような人物を任命することで行われている(事務総長を含む)。この影響力のあるプロジェクトの成果は、運用レベルと正統性のレベルの両方において重要なものとなっている。このプロジェクトでは、国連組織が繁栄するためには、国連高官の任命プロセスを抜本的に見直す必要があると結論付けている。

研究成果の学術的意義や社会的意義

This project has considerable scientific and social significance in that it shows that the politicisation of senior UN appointments is detrimental to the legitimacy and efficiency of the UN organization as a whole and suggests ways to overcome this.

研究成果の概要(英文)：Through the production of two research monographs, several scientific articles, conference papers and other presentations, my project has found that the influence of great powers on the UN Secretariat is considerable. This is done through the appointments of officials who are supposed to be independent and impartial, but who are influenced through a variety of means (including the Secretary-General). The results of this project of influence are considerable, both at the operational level and at the level of legitimacy. The project concludes that if the UN organization is to thrive, the appointment process of senior UN officials must be overhauled.

研究分野：International Relations

キーワード：Secretariat bureaucracy appointments

## 様式 C - 19、F - 19 - 1、Z - 19 (共通)

### 1 . 研究開始当初の背景

The aim of this research project was to investigate the ways in which the US and China influence the United Nations Secretariat—the world’s largest international civil service. Although a lot of research has been conducted on the UN as a whole, its civil service remains largely unexplored. This is surprising because, as the UN Preparatory Commission wrote in 1946, “The degree to which the objectives of the Charter can be realized will be determined by the manner in which the Secretariat performs its tasks”.

Likewise, although plenty of literature exists on the Security Council and particularly on its Permanent Members, little has been written by scholars on the influence of the US and China upon the Secretariat. Given their superpower status and the impact of the Secretariat’s decisions globally, understanding how the UN civil service works is essential. UN officials are legally required by the UN Charter to be independent and impartial; in probing whether this is the case, my project raised several questions about the UN bureaucracy: How and why do the US and China—the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ global superpower, respectively— influence UN officials? Are UN departments under the control of the Secretary-General, as the UN Charter requires? And what role can Japan—currently underrepresented in New York—play in that process?

The project aimed to investigate *how* and *for whom* the UN Secretariat works and to suggest ways to make it more accountable and more democratic. This was to be done by consulting a number of archives, including private ones, as well as to rely on my experience as a former diplomat in the Office of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General, which gives me an insider’s perspective of the UN.

### 2 . 研究の目的

The purpose of the research was to address three main research questions:

- How and why do the great powers influence the staffing and decisions of the UN Secretariat?
- What impact does such influence have on long-term UN norms and policies?
- Which strategies can Japan adopt to respond to this situation?

In addition to the above questions, my goal was to address four broader *sub-questions*:

- Are UN officials as independent and impartial as the UN Charter requires them to be?
- Are their neutrality and impartiality essential to achieve ‘good global governance’, in the same way as an impartial civil service is needed to achieve ‘good domestic governance’ at the national level?
- Given the Secretariat’s role in the production of UN norms, does controlling the UN bureaucracy also mean controlling short-term UN decisions and long-term UN term norms (e.g. human rights)?
- If so, what is left of the Secretary-General’s own role as a ‘norm entrepreneur’?

### 3 . 研究の方法

To understand how UN officials are appointed, work, and come to their decisions in New York, my project has relied on a wide **range of primary sources that have never been used by scholars before** - including some of the largest private archives on the UN. Thus, archival research (especially in the context of elite private archives) and textual analysis have been the main research methods used to conduct this project.

In addition, the project has supplemented these archival materials with over 50 elite interviews with key decision-makers in Washington, New York and Tokyo, including 2 former UN Secretaries-General; 3 former UN Under-Secretaries-General; 27 former ambassadors; 6 former ministers; and 21 current and former diplomats from the US, China, and Japan.

## **4 . 研究成果**

By producing two research monographs, two scientific papers and other materials, my project has made three contributions to existing debates—at the bureaucratic, power political, and conceptual levels. These are part of the project’s larger argument according to which the Secretariat ought to be seen as a developing ‘political’ institution that is distinct from (though hardly independent of) other UN organs.

### Bureaucratic Politics

The first contribution of the project involves bureaucratic politics and intra-Secretariat relations. My project concludes that the UN Secretariat is first and foremost a bureaucracy, one that is made up of several administrative units linked to each other by processes of both cooperation and competition—and, I argue, by a variety of interests. While some of these interests are shared by all Secretariat units, others differ from—and even clash with—each other. This is part of what my research refers to as the sectorial, factionalized, ‘Where one sits depends on where one stands’ approach to bureaucratic decision-making, one that is common to most large bureaucracies. To account for this, the project has ‘deconstructed’ the Secretariat by reviewing the roles played by each of its main departments, the reasons for this distribution of functions, the changes that these departments have undergone through the years, and their impact on the wider Organization. The rationale for this ‘anatomical’ approach is twofold. First, even the constructivist literature has stopped short of ‘deconstructing’ the UN Secretariat into its constituent parts and has refrained from assessing their roles and influence in New York, partly because of a lack of internal documentation. Second, one of the Secretariat’s distinctive features is the fact that, three quarters of a century into its birth, the distribution of functions among its bureaucratic units remains ill-defined. In asking why this is so, the project has answered the above research questions and has explained why, when, and how were these departments created; how successive reforms altered their roles; who works for them, how and why these officials were chosen, and how they (and their nationalities) make a difference to the drafting and implementation of UN norms. Lastly, the project also explained which departments are the most ‘influential’ from a bureaucratic standpoint, who heads them, and how do they interact with other organs.

### Power Politics

The second contribution given by my project concerns the nature of the Secretariat’s relations with member states—a controversial topic that the literature has only recently begun to tackle. By reviewing the history of interactions between UN bureaucrats and the membership, the project found that different departments have been able to rely on the support of different states with widely different understandings of UN norms and practices. This partly explains the contradictory approaches taken by different sections of the UN bureaucracy toward the same issue, as well as the variable levels of interventionism of UN officials and departments alike—especially in the peace and security sector. This is a significant departure from the bureaucratic politics paradigm and one that I first encountered in Rwanda, where the literature had trouble grasping the fact that—let alone explaining the reasons why—different parts of the same bureaucracy (such as the ‘political’ and peacekeeping departments) would adopt different positions (such as intervention and non-intervention) towards the same operation, despite sharing a range of bureaucratic interests. One reason is that at Headquarters bureaucratic politics works within the larger framework of IR, and although it is SGs who formally head the Secretariat, the agenda setting, content, and direction of UN initiatives are often the result of competition among member states—a ‘power-political’ struggle of sorts in which departments become the ultimate prize. This is another contribution of my project, which used peacebuilding and peacekeeping as examples of the above arguments. It concluded that interactions between the supposedly ‘technical’ peacekeeping department and the ‘political’ one are much more than standard relations between equal bureaucratic units; they reflect the prevailing power dynamics at Headquarters, a place where most states have consistently opposed the idea of providing SGs with an effective ‘political’ department precisely because of the undetermined nature of the SG’s own role—one that is also ambiguously called ‘political’. In New York, competition between UN departments is more than a struggle for bureaucratic influence or a clash of personalities; it is also an attempt to assert the independence of SGs vis-à-vis states.

### Conceptual Confusion

However, my project found that bureaucratic politics and power politics alone are not the only factors behind the Secretariat’s long-standing pathologies. A third contributor is the conceptual confusion surrounding key UN norms, many of which remain surprisingly imprecise. This is especially the case for what are perceived to be highly ‘political’ matters such as peace (as shown by the perennial disagreements over its meaning); the scope and objectives of ‘peacebuilding’; and the operational limits of ‘peacekeeping’. These debates are hardly ‘technical’ or administrative in nature, as some parts of the UN bureaucracy would have it; on the contrary, they have accompanied the UN since its establishment and involve norms that are

foundational to the UN's mission of preventing international conflict. My project provided a threefold explanation for this intellectual nebulosity.

First, it found that bureaucratic structures (such as departments) were established in New York before concepts (such as peacebuilding and peacekeeping) could be clarified and tested in the field. Since many UN norms have never been explicitly agreed upon by states, let alone formally defined, it is unsurprising that the remit of the administrative units which are supposed to implement them remains vague. Once again, the UN's peace and security architecture provides a prime example of this: the (contested) establishment of a 'political' department supposedly in charge of 'peacebuilding' alongside an 'operational' one dedicated to peacekeeping, in the absence of clear ideas as to where one norm begins and the other ends, shows the ways in which conceptual confusion breeds bureaucratic duplication. Both are worsened by the fact that these departments have historically had different 'patrons', with the result that power-political tensions are integral to the Secretariat's decision-making processes.

Second, my project found that the conceptual ambiguity surrounding UN norms has been opportunistically used by all three UN actors—states, SGs, and Secretariat officials—to achieve a variety of different and even incompatible goals, with states as keen to welcome the support of 'disinterested UN experts' as they are ready to denounce the opposition of 'unrepresentative UN bureaucrats', depending on their success in influencing officials. If bureaucratic power is, as Weber observed, "control based on knowledge", then influencing how such knowledge is produced and used is important. The rather extraordinary result of my research is that, 75 years after the birth of the world's most prominent international organization, confusion still reigns over the Secretariat's core roles and over the departments responsible for implementing them.

Third and last, my project found that problems in the field typically stem from institutional issues at Headquarters, in turn caused by an unclear delineation of roles among inimical UN departments that are supported by different actors and that struggle to identify their own functions, let alone those of other parts of the Secretariat. Bureaucratic politics alone, therefore, cannot explain its pathologies; the fact that at different times and for different reasons, these departments have had different 'cheerleaders' with different understandings of UN norms contribute to perpetuate those pathologies.

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〔産業財産権〕

〔その他〕

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6. 研究組織

	氏名 (ローマ字氏名) (研究者番号)	所属研究機関・部局・職 (機関番号)	備考
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7. 科研費を使用して開催した国際研究集会

〔国際研究集会〕 計0件

8. 本研究に関連して実施した国際共同研究の実施状況

共同研究相手国	相手方研究機関
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