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研究課題名(和文) Parties for Hire: Non-Programmatic Parties in Coalitional Politics

研究課題名(英文) Parties for Hire: Non-Programmatic Parties in Coalitional Politics

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研究成果の概要(和文)：この研究では政党連合が形成され持続する要因について検討を行った。政党同士が選挙戦や政権形成時に連立政権を結ぶ動機を理論化し、政党連立が政治的安定性や民主的ガバナンスにもたらす結果を明らかにした。この研究のもたらす主な貢献は、政策指向的ではない政党に焦点を当てたことだ。非政策指向的な政党は、特定利益のみを追求し、特定の公共政策上の目標をもっていない。こうした政党のもつインセンティブは他の政党のものと異なるため、比較政治学の先行研究でこれまでいわれてきたやり方とは異なるかたちで、連合形成の政治に影響を与える。この研究プロジェクトの実証分析のために、ラテンアメリカ地域の民主主義諸国を主に検討した。

研究成果の概要(英文)：This research project investigated the formation and duration of political coalitions. The project theorized about the motivations that lead political parties to form partnerships in elections and in government, and demonstrated the consequences of parties' coalitional strategies for political stability and democratic governance. The primary contribution of this research stems from its focus on non-programmatic political parties. Non-programmatic parties seek only particularistic benefits; they do not have public policy goals. Because their incentives differ from those of other parties, non-programmatic parties influence coalitional politics in ways not previously explained by the comparative politics literature. The empirical component of the project concentrated on the multiparty democracies of Latin America.

研究分野：Political Science

キーワード：Comparative Politics Political Parties Coalitions Elections Accountability Latin America Democracy

1. 研究開始当初の背景

This research project focuses on the composition and stability of political coalitions to understand how multiparty democracies are governed. Models of government formation and dissolution in the political science literature emphasize coalitional bargaining over public policies. The standard theoretical framework assumes that parties cultivate programmatic reputations regarding the interests of social classes that they represent and take positions on a left-right dimension regarding the redistribution of wealth. Yet in many democratic systems around the globe, political power and the office benefits that power entails, trump policy goals. By recognizing that some political parties win election and re-election by providing particularistic benefits to their supporters, rather than the more standard policy programs that most scholars consider when characterizing parties, and by incorporating these non-programmatic parties into the study of coalition politics, this project offers a valuable contribution to the field of comparative politics.

The empirical focus of the project is on democratic Latin America. Although the case of the United States of America is a thoroughly studied exception, most presidents face more than two parties in the legislature and most presidential elections are multiparty contests. In a manner that is more similar to governments in the parliamentary systems of Western Europe, Israel or Japan, Latin American presidents often form coalitions to win election and pass policy. Improving our understanding of how coalition governments form and collapse in Latin America is important because presidents' coalitional strategies influence electoral outcomes, the quality of governance, the extent of economic reform, and the viability of democracy.

2. 研究の目的

Challenging previous research that tended to link presidents lack of stable majority support to ineffective policy-making and legislative immobilism, the objective of this research project was to show that coalition instability in some conditions actually indicates flexibility. The project hypothesized that where non-programmatic parties are represented in the legislature, presidents gain

sufficient coalitional flexibility by distributing "pork" and patronage to these parties that they are able to govern successfully without forming stable governing majorities. The core theoretical aim of this research project was to demonstrate that non-programmatic politics and coalitional instability are mutually self-enforcing.

Another aim of the project was to expand the investigation of coalitional politics in multiparty presidential systems to the electoral arena. Pre-electoral coalitions in presidential systems were largely overlooked or dismissed as unimportant by previous research. This research project sought to fill this gap in the literature by showing that presidential pre-electoral coalitions are common and by exploring the incentives, and disincentives, that parties have to join coalitions in support of another party's presidential candidate. The project also sought to improve our understanding of the connection between pre-electoral coalitions and post-electoral governments in terms of cabinet composition and stability.

A final research aim of this project focused on the consequences of coalitional strategies for important normative concerns, such as governability, accountability, competition, political stability, and the quality of democracy. In summary, the purpose of the project was to provide innovative interpretations of coalitional politics in specific cases and contexts and to offer insight on democratic governance more broadly.

3. 研究の方法

This research project followed scientific methods. The theoretical arguments were rigorously tested using statistical methods appropriate for time-series, cross-national data.

The project involved considerable data collection. The PI expanded her original database on political parties, pre-electoral coalitions, and governing coalitions to encompass twelve Latin American countries between 1980 and 2013. This database also contains information on constitutional rules and various political institutions. It is the primary source of data for the various quantitative analyses conducted as part of this project.

The project also involved qualitative research of specific cases with the purpose of clarifying key concepts and illuminating the causal mechanisms proposed in the theoretical arguments.

4. 研究成果

(1) Some political parties seek only particularistic benefits; they do not have public policy goals. These non-programmatic parties cultivate reputations as providers of patronage and pork and seek positions in the governing coalition in order to gain access to resources that can be channeled to their supporters in the electorate. Because particularistic benefits cannot be ordered from left to right, non-programmatic parties cannot be understood using the framework articulated in standard theories of legislative bargaining and coalition negotiations that structure politics in left-right terms and focus on public policy.

(2) By providing presidents with coalitional flexibility, non-programmatic parties allow some presidents to find the votes that they need to pass legislation without making major concessions on the policy content of their reform agendas. Indicative of such coalitional flexibility, in Latin America, the legislative representation of non-programmatic parties makes presidential coalitions less stable and makes majority government less common.

(3) In presidential systems, political parties cannot use pre-electoral coalitions to secure access to patronage, pork and other government benefits under the control of presidents because they cannot hold presidents accountable to these “cheap talk” agreements usually made behind closed doors. Hence, presidential electoral coalitions in Latin America tend not to include non-programmatic political parties, even though these parties are unconstrained by ideological considerations.

(4) Policy agreements made publicly between coalition partners during presidential electoral campaigns can help parties pursue policy goals and programmatic political parties are more likely to form presidential electoral coalitions as the ideological distance between them decreases. When they win presidential elections in Latin America, pre-electoral coalitions usually translate

into post-electoral governing coalitions. Along with the post-electoral bargaining environment, pre-electoral interparty agreements entailing a particular policy mandate influence the composition and stability of governing coalitions in presidential systems.

5. 主な発表論文等

(研究代表者、研究分担者及び連携研究者には下線)

〔雑誌論文〕(計2件)

Kellam, Marisa. 2015. Forthcoming. “Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?” *British Journal of Political Science*.

Kellam, Marisa. 2013. “Parties for Hire: How Particularistic Parties Influence Presidents’ Governing Strategies.” *Party Politics*. Online First (June 7): 1-12. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068813487109>

〔学会発表〕(計2件)

Kellam, Marisa and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. “Winning Coalitions in Presidential Systems: Pre-Electoral Alliances and Post-Electoral Governments in Latin America.” Paper presented at the Political Institutions Workshop at Keio University in Tokyo on March 1, 2015.

Kellam, Marisa and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. “Winning Coalitions in Presidential Systems: Pre-Electoral Alliances and Post-Electoral Governments in Latin America.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, IL on September 1, 2013.

〔図書〕(計 件)

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6. 研究組織

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