| Project/Area Number |
02630030
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
経済事情及び政策学
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| Research Institution | Tokai University |
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Principal Investigator |
KAWANOBE Hiroyuki Tokai University, School of Political Science & Economics, Professor, 政治経済学部, 教授 (60119667)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1990 – 1991
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1991)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
Fiscal Year 1991: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 1990: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
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| Keywords | Institutional Change / Public Choice / Political Economy |
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| Research Abstract |
This research develops political economic models of institutional changes using tools of constitutional political economy and public choice.
At first, the research surveys the political economic literatures on the institutional changes and the relation between socio-economic structural changes and institutional changes.
Extensions of game theoretic models of institutional changes are made in three ways : 1. Extensions of game theoretic models in a chicken game and a co-ordination game situation as well as a prisoners' dilemma one. 2. Investigations of conditions for the realization of institutional changes in respect to an uncertainty. 3. Variations of models with regard to the composition of agents.
Investigations of the conditions which influence the prospects for institutional changes are made introducing following aspects to game theoretic institutional change models ; the fixation of institutions, socio-economic structural changes, variations of agents involved in the public decision making.
The research links constitutional reform arguments and rent-seeking models. The former is developed by constitutional political economy which advocates an unanimous consent, and the latter is argued by Positive public choice scholars Finally, comparisons between the US and Japan institutional changes are made in respect of the differences of underlying prohibited institutions.
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