| Project/Area Number |
03301073
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Co-operative Research (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
一般理論
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| Research Institution | University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
FUJIWARA Masahiro (1992) University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics. Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (40114988)
宇沢 弘文 (1991) 東京大学, 経済学部, 名誉教授 (20012106)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OKADA Akira Kyoto University, The Institute of Economic Research, Assistant Professor, 経済研究所, 助教授 (90152298)
ITOH Hideshi Kyoto University, Faculty of Economics, Assistant Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (80203165)
KAWAMATA Kunjo Kejo University, Department of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (30051569)
SUZUMURA Kotaro Hitotsubashi University, The Institute of Economic Research. Professor, 経済研究所, 教授 (00017550)
UZAWA Hirofumi University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics, Honorary Professor, 経済学部, 名誉教授 (20012106)
金本 良嗣 東京大学, 経済学部, 教授 (00134198)
船木 由喜彦 東洋大学, 経済学部, 助教授 (50181433)
藤原 正寛 東京大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40114988)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1991 – 1992
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1992)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥15,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥15,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1992: ¥3,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1991: ¥12,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥12,000,000)
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| Keywords | Game Theory / Social Choice / Liberty and Rights / Evolutionary Game Theory / Game Experiments / Organization and Custom / Measures against Global Warming / Non-linear Dynamic System / 自由のパラドックス / 限定合理性 / 日本型企業組織 / 地球環境問題 / 動学的経済システム / インセンティブ / 情報の経済学 / ゲ-ム理論 / 環境政策 / 社会慣行 / 非分割財 / 最適直接税 / 日本型経済組織 |
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| Research Abstract |
In this research, we attempted to construct new analytical frameworks to examine desirable social institutions as well as environments, such as organizational forms, social customs and global environments, in an economic system using game theory and dynamic economic system theory.
1. We undertook a game theoretic research to examine decentralized resource allocation under different social institutions and environment so that we can design a desirable institutions and environments. In particular, we analyzed significance and effects of introducing lotteries in implementing social decision function in decentralized manner, tradeoffs between liberty and efficiency in restricting strategy sets of each individual within a society. We also showed, using evolutionary game theory approach with bounded rational players, the importance of the role of custom in inducting coordination among players, and, using experimental game theory, the role of social norms in human decision making.
2. We analyzed how the extent of authority delegations, wage structure and promotion system within an organization affect the degree of cooperation and information exchange among employees, and characterized the Japanese organizational structure compared with those in other countries.
3. We characterized the desirable properties of carbon tax, in view of dynamic efficiency as well as international equity, as a measure against global warming. We also analyzed the mechanism of how the business cycle diffuses dynamically and internationally using non-linear dynamics, and examined how asymmetric information affects macro-economic behavior through investment using monopolistic competition models.
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