| Project/Area Number |
05451096
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Civil law
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| Research Institution | Hokkaido University |
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Principal Investigator |
HAYASHIDA Seimei Hokkaido University ; Faculty of Law ; Professor, 法学部, 教授 (50145356)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
HASEGAWA Ko Hokkaido University ; Faculty of Law ; Professor, 法学部, 教授 (90164813)
KOJO Makoto Sophia University ; Faculty of Law ; Professor, 法学部, 教授 (80013027)
MATSUMURA Yoshiyuki Hokkaido University ; Faculty of Law ; Professor, 法学部, 教授 (80091502)
太田 勝造 東京大学, 大学院・法学政治学研究科, 助教授 (40152136)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1993 – 1995
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1995)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1995: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 1994: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1993: ¥2,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000)
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| Keywords | Corporation's activities / Crime / Deterrence / Law and economics / Anti-trust law / Principal-agency / Vicarious liability / Distributive justice / 代理 |
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| Research Abstract |
We have studied planning an legal-system to deter corporations' illegal or unlawful conducts and activities optimally. This study took approach based on the model of principal-agency, and generally used the analytical tools of the law and economics. Using these models and tools, we approached the problem of the optimal deterrence from many legal aspects. We dealt and analyzed the problem theoretically and positively. That is as follows :
1. We analyzed crimes or illegal conducts by organizations and corporations themselves, and their employees under the principal-agency model. In this area, the deterrence system works relatively well, compared with other law.
2. We dealt with problems including principal-agency relationship and similar relationships in transaction-law, and employer's liability for unlawful conducts (torts) by their employees (vicarious liability) in tort law. These legal rules, it has been traditionally understood, could not create an incentive to deter illegal actions, but they have a possibility to induce incentives to deter.
3. There had been, to some extent, effective incentives to deter illegal activities and conspiracies under the many kinds of sanctions of Anti-trust law of Japan.
4. We analyzed the problem of the corporation's legal and social responsibility from the point of the legal-philosophical analysis. we have found that the legal system should induce corporations or enterprises, seeking efficiency in producing goods and servies, to have incentives to deter illegal conducts effectively ; it is necessary that the optimal deterrence system should be based on the fairness values in the market.
Based on the above positive analysis, researches and investigations by each members of this study have been integrated. We have got conclusions that our legal system induces some incentives to deter illegal activities, but it is not still an optimal deterrence system. There should be some improvements toward an optimal deterrence system.
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