| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1996: ¥300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 1995: ¥200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥200,000)
Fiscal Year 1994: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
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| Research Abstract |
In this research project, we study economic models with indivisible goods. There are two kinds of models : one-sided models and two-sided models. This research project consists of two parts : theoretical part and empirical part. In the theoretical research part, we have five papers. In the first paper, we study a one-sided model with indivisible good and asymmetric information. In the research we show that there exists a certain kind of equilibrium that cannot exists in models with infinitely divisible good. In the second paper, we give a complete characterization of the core of assignment problems by using some axioms including a consistency axiom. This characterization can be interpreted as a characterization of a set of competitive equilibria of a general equilibrium model with indivisible goods. In the third paper, we study matching problems with externalities. We give an appropriate definition of stability in this setting and investigate some properties of the set of stable matchinges Although a stable matching in not necessarily Pareto-optimal, we prove that there exists a stable and Pareto-optimal matching. In the fourth paper, we study a fixed-price economy with indivisible good. We show that there is only one resource allocation mechanism that satisfies the strategy-proofness, Pareto-optimality, and anonymity. In the fifth paper, we study a matching problem with one-sided externalities. For the empirical research, we study a college admission problems and we find some empirical evidences which indicate that recommendation by some high school is determined by the Gale-Shapley Algorithm. We discuss some merits of the mechanism.
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