| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000)
Fiscal Year 1995: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 1994: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This study intended, reviewing the fact that collusion (or dango) in many of the auctions for public construction and intervention by Diet-men and/or local governors into the auction/determination of the successful bidders had received a great attention and posed a big problem of reconsidering the system of public administration in Japan, to analyze causes of those collusions and also to consider alternative auction-administration system to secure a more efficiency in the auctions for public constructions. Especially, I searched more efficient auction systems from basic and theoretical point of view, noting first that dango is said to be very common in the auctions for public constructions irrespective of their importance in terms of both money amounts and significance in arranging infrastructure for the economy, and second that there seems to be little analyzes of the auction system taking account of the features in the public-construction auctions in Japan.
While the study lasted two fiscal years, the first year study surveyed the history of the problem, made clear the main features in Japanese dango problems, and arranged the preceding analyzes to clarify the possibilities of theoretical studies reviewing the features of dango prblems in Japan.
The second year study, based on the above, paid an attention to the fact that a central cause lies in high cooperativeness among constructive businesses, and analyzed the following : First, I surveyed how the collusion-dango problems are analyzed in the preceding auction literature. Second, reviewing the feature specific to the Japanese dango, I analyzed what kind of auction system and its surrounding conditions are effective for more efficient auction result, finding that disclosure of information in any auction and cost-sharing by the government to enlarge bidders will be most effective by increasing competitiveness among possible bidders.
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