| Project/Area Number |
07630086
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | KOBE UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
TAKIGAWA Yoshio KOBE UNIV., ECONOMICS,PROFESSOR, 経済学部, 教授 (30135777)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1995 – 1996
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1996)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
Fiscal Year 1996: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 1995: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
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| Keywords | Banking Business / Public Spirit / Normative Analysis / Game Theory / Postal Saving Banks / バブル / 銀行 / 官営の郵便貯金 / 郵便貯金の民営化 / 社会的厚生 / 複占モデル / 預貯金市場 / 公共性 / 投機 / 情報の非対称性 / 規範的分析 |
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| Research Abstract |
1. Banking Business and "Public Spirit" of Banks
2. The Economic Function of Banking Business
(1) Raison d'etre of Banks
(2) Special Characteristics of Banks
3. Normative Analysis of Banking Business
(1) Industrial Policy of Banking Business
(2) Normative Analysis of Banking Business
4. Private Finance and Public Finance : A Game Theoretical Analysis
We construct a duopoly model of commercial bank and Postal Saving Banks and study static and dynamic games between them. This paper consists of ;
I Introduction
II Static and dynamic Cournot games between private financial intermediaries
III Static and dynamic Cournot games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries
IV Monopoly behavior of public financial intermediaries and private financial intermediaries
V Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries
VI Dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries where the financial product is indifferent
VII Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries where the financial product is differentiated
VIII Static and dynamic Bertrand games between private financial intermediaries and public financial intermediaries where the financial product is differentiated
IX Conclusions
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