Imperfect Information in Contracts between Farm Contractor and Farm : Interpretation by Extensive Form Game
| Project/Area Number |
07806029
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Agro-economics
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| Research Institution | HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
OSANAMI Fumio Hokkaido Univ., Fac.of Agr., Associate Pro., 農学部, 助教授 (00113697)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
XIU Shinketsu Hokusei Univ., Fac.of Econ., Lecturer, 経済学部, 講師 (90285510)
KONDO Takumi Hokkaido Univ., Fac.of Agr., Instructor, 農学部, 助手 (40178413)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1995 – 1996
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1996)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1996: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1995: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Keywords | Organization of Farm Contract / Contract / Game Theory / Imperfect Information / Enforceability of Contracts / Farm Contractor / Quality of Service / Difficulty with the Work / 農作業受委託 / 高度な作業 / 易しい作業 / ゲーム論 / 情報の非対称性 / 農業機械利用組合 / 農協営 |
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| Research Abstract |
Although Japanese agriculture is highly mechanized, the cost of farm machinery is much higher in Japan than in other developed countries, largely owing to the lower utilization of machine-capacity under conditions of small-scale farming on small and widely-scattered plots. It is hoped that the farm contractor will present a possible alternative to over-investment in costly farm machinery.
This paper introduces the effects of imperfect information on farm contracts. The extensive form game model was used to analyze this introduction of imperfect or asymmetrical information, and to discuss the conditions for ideal type of farm contractor. We proceed from the assumption that farmers do not perceive the quality of a farm contractor's services, and that they lack the objective criterion to judge the quality of services in advance. Typically, farmers receive only information about the contractor's fee. In terms of the game theoretical analysis, the preceding situation is common knowledge among playrs. The extensive-form game interpretation of farmer/contractor contracts revealed that the most plausible solution to the theoretical model was the combination of low charge and low-quality service. In fact, the combination of high charge and high-quality service is even more profitable for both parties, but does not represent a realistic solution due to a state of imperfect information, and the so-called prisoner's dilemma to which this ignorance gives rise.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(3 results)
