| Budget Amount *help |
¥6,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥6,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
Fiscal Year 1996: ¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000)
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| Research Abstract |
We can hardly say that a comparative research on industrial groupings in Japan and in Germany is a popular theme. In fact, it is very difficult to make a strict research on this theme based on the appropriate and reasonable economic theory of organization, especially the new institutional economic theory of organization. We planed to make an economic analysis of the industrial groupings in Japan and in Germany, mainly on the control power within the industrial groupings in both countries. At first, we tried to research them both theoretically and empirically at once. But it turned out that such attempt is very hard and thereafter we tried to analyze them firstly theoretically based on the new institutional economic theory of organization, mainly on "principal-agent theory" as much as possible. While analyzing them, it turned out that the control power within the industrial groupings is closely related to the problem of "corporate governance" of the groups and the firms in the groups. T
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he most important requirement there, is how to share the outcome fairly among the stakeholders of the group.
Then we analyzed the effect of the "governance cost" and we argued not only on the disadvantage of groupings as very usually asserted but also on the advantage of them. In the following part, we made an economic analysis of the Konzern in Germany. We could find that there are additional difficulties to monitor the Konzern and its subsidiaries correctly. As the instrument to do it, we mentioned two topics concerning the monitoring.
Finally, we supplement two articles to support our statement. The former is written in German and it was published in Germany as a part of a German academic book on business management. In this article, it is argued that the traditional theory of Japanese Management is out of date and even injurious. We made it theoretically clear that new form of Japanese Management Style is necessary, based on the principal-agent-theory.
In the second article, which is written in English, we tried to make it clear, that the role of so-called main banks is best analyzed and interpreted through the principal-agent-theory. This article is the first step to make an empirical analysis of our theme and we will try further to complete our empirical analysis on the control power of the industrial groupings both in Japan and in Germany, which we could not finish in this research, to our regret. Less
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