| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 1996: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
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| Research Abstract |
We analyzed some cases of intended social change with game theoretic models and studied the mechanism that determines success of failure of intended social change. Then we got the following results : Intended social change begins with the introduction of institutions by the change agent in society. Then the introduced institutions cause multiple social results in some cases. If some of such multiple social results lead to success of the intended social change while others lead to failure of the intended social change, there is always a possibility that the intended social change fails. This is because the change agent cannot predict success or failure of the intended social change, even though it knows there is a possibility of failure. This is one reason intended social change fails.
It has become clear during the above analysis that trust among focal actors influences the results of intended social change, but the relationship between them is not so simple as the following proposition : The higher level of trust among actors increases the probability of success of intended social change. We, therefore, build a model of trust and a model of trust with effects of social networks in which the focal actors are embedded. We got the following results by analyzing these models : If there is not a social network among the actors, trustors always incur possibility of being betrayd by the trustee ; If there is a social network among the actors and the trustee is not myopic, however, the trustors can trust the trustee without hesitation. These results suggest that social networks have great influence on success or failure of intended social change.
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