| Project/Area Number |
08630004
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | CHIBA UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
SAKAKIBARA Kenichi Chiba University, Faculty of Law and Economics, Associate Professor, 法経学部, 助教授 (30187009)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SUGA Koichi Fukuoka University, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (00171116)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1996 – 1997
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1997)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 1996: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
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| Keywords | Hobbes / social contract / state of nature / the state / dynamic model / property rights / ゲーム / 所有権 / 民主制 |
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| Research Abstract |
This reserch adresses the question of how the state is established in a Hobbesian anarchy. We consider a dynamic economy with non-overlapping generations in which every agent may steal, protect or produce a private good. In each generation, agents try to establish the state under the unanimous rule. If the state is established, it enforces tax and guarantees property rights by preventing theft. Our gage theoretic analysis shows that there are three situations in the economy : (i) the state is established if every agent's endowment is greater than a critical level and the encowments are relatively equally distributed ; (ii) the state is not established and the state of peace (no theft) emerges in the state of nature if every agent's endowment is the critical level or less ; (iii) the state is not established and the state of war (theft) emerges in the state of nature. The state of peace goes into the state of war in the process of economic development.
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