| Project/Area Number |
09610013
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Philosophy
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Ibaraki National College of Technology |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
KAMIYAMA Kazuyoshi Ibaraki National College of Technology, Associate Professor, 一般科目, 助教授 (80161230)
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MATSUHISA Takasi Ibaraki National College of Technology, Lecturer, 一般科目, 講師 (40219473)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
1997 – 1998
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1998)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | progmatism / epistemic logic / common knowledge / consensus / Nash equilibrium / monotonicity / axiom of truth / the problem of induction / コンセンサス / コンヴェンション / 論理的全知 / 知者のパラドクス / 合意 / ゲーム理論基礎論 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
1. We criticized the game-theoretic study on common knowledge from the epistemological point of view.
2. We found that the Barcan axiom (or the requirement of monotonicity) is the key requirement of the standard analysis and has some problems from the viewpoint of bounded rationality. We proposed a research program ("reductionism") that dispenses with it.
3. We attempted the analysis according to the program and found that we can characterize the Nash equilibrium without the Barcan axiom.
4. We criticized the research program itself from several points of view. We found that a boundary of it is in the fact that it uses the rational man hypothesis, that is, it is based on the assumption that all players are "rational" in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947). We pointed out that the first analysis of common knowledge by David Lewis in "Convention : A Philosophical Analysis" (1969) does not use it and has certain significance from the viewpoint of bounded rationality.
|
