Strategic Effects of R」ヲD Investments
| Project/Area Number |
09630044
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済政策(含経済事情)
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| Research Institution | KYOTO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
IMAI Haruo Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, Professor, 経済研究所, 教授 (10144396)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
今井 晴雄 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (10144396)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1997 – 1999
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1999)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
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| Keywords | R&D / Bargaining Problems / Licensing / Imperfect Information / 不完備情報 |
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| Research Abstract |
In this research, we investigate the effect of R&D investments on the bargaining over licensing a technology between technologically advanced and trailing firms, as well as the role of information and the patent system. Besides, we intend to deal with theoretical issues in the related field of bargaining games.
In our main model based upon infinite time horizon and agents' ability to cope with sufficiently complex strategies, efficiency could be improved by licensing possibilities. The result is analogous to the one in repeated games but has not been recognized in this bargaining context, as the setting is somewhat different.
In this last year of the project, we examined the issue of information-the effect of observability of the R&D investment level, and the finite life of a patent. In each case, it was verified that the effect has the expected sign, while a detailed analysis cannot be carried out due to the multiplicity of the solution or the patterns.
As for the lack of observability of R&D investment level, one can confirm that licensing incentive weakness as the effect of investment over bargaining becomes tenuous. However, the situation is one of the signaling games and so a plethora of equilibria emerges corresponding to diversity of the patterns of expectations.
Also the finite life of patent yields the well-expected effect of reducing the incentive for licensing. However, the incentive does not necessarily change monotonically with the length of the patent and depending on the shape of investment cost growth, lengthening the life could induce no deal.
As to the theoretical aspects, we have launched a project examining theoretical framework in which many technologically advanced and trailing nations, banding together respectively, bargain over technology transfer in the context of investment in the CO2 emission reduction projects in an attempt to mitigate the global warming problem.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(14 results)
