| Project/Area Number |
09630113
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Business administration
|
|---|
| Research Institution | YOKOHAMA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
YOSHIMOR Masaru Yokohama National University, Business Administration, Professor, 経営学部, 教授 (20182834)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
1997 – 1998
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1998)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | France / Corporate Governance / Intercorporate relations / main bank / stable shareholders / Cross Shareholdings / Holding company / capitalism / コーポレートガバナンス / 主取引銀行 / 敵対的買収 / 経営者支配 / コ-ポレート・ガバナンス / 所有構造 / メーンバンク |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
French capitalism is characterized by the fact that it is in the middle ground between Anglo-Saxon capitalism and Rhein capitalism. France has in common with Germany and Japan the existence of stable shareholders to fend off hostile takeovers, cross shareholdings and the resulting lack of the market for corporate control. This explains the relatively low level of effectiveness of corporate governance in these countries relative to the U.S. France is distinct from Germany and Japan for the lack of the main bank which bails out a client firm in financial distress. This may be explained by the direct funding and the rescue operations traditionally undertaken by the French administration in the form of economic planning and industrial policy. A second explanation is the relatively short experience of the French with the universal bank system. For this reason, French banks are neutral as their counterparts in the Unite States and do not generally maintain as close relations with their client firms as German or Japanese banks do. French banks normally confine their role to that of provider of funds and a stable shareholder to protect their clients from hostile takeover bids. Insurance firms play similar roles as stable shareholders.
The European market integration, the single currency as well as the increasingly large portfolios of Anglo-Saxon institutional shareholders exposed France to international competition earlier than Japan. French managers have shown increasing interest in the Anglo-American corporate governance and its effectiveness has been improving. Nevertheless, the expected convergence of French capitalism on the Anglo-American model will be partial. This is because few large firms are available for hostile takeovers, as most of them are family controlled or under management control through cross shareholdings. Another reason is that a large number of firms are managed by the old boy network who come from top universities via the state bureaucracy.
|
