| Project/Area Number |
09680428
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
社会システム工学
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology (1998-1999)
Tokyo Metropolitan University (1997) |
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Principal Investigator |
MUTO Shigeo Tokyo Institute of Technology, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Professor, 大学院・社会理工学研究化, 教授 (50126330)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1997 – 1999
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1999)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 1997: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
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| Keywords | social dilemma / prisoner's dilemma / cooperation / game theory / stable set / stationary equilibrium / Pareto efficiency / individual rationality / 湖の汚染 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research studies prisoner's dilemma and social dilemma from the standpoint of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets with farsightedness of players. The following are the main results.
1 Prisoner's dilemma: When two players behave independently, the unique stable set consists of two states: both cooperate or both defect. If mixed strategies are allowed, every pair of mixed strategies is included in a stable set. When they are allowed to communicate, even though agreements are not binding, there exists a unique stable set consisting of one outcome : both cooperate. If players use mixed strategies, all stable sets consist of Pareto optimal outcomes. Moreover, stationary equlibria in an alternating-move prisoner's dilemma game provide us with similar outcomes as stable sets.
2 Social dilemma: In a social dilemma (a prisoner's dilemma with many players), even though no agreement among players is binding, outcomes in any stables set are Pareto optimal and individually rational.
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