| Project/Area Number |
10551002
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B).
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 展開研究 |
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| Research Field |
実験系心理学
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| Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
SHIGEMASU Kazuo The University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Professor, 大学院・総合文化研究科, 教授 (90091701)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KAMEDA Tatsuya Hokkaido University, Faculty of Literature, Associate Professor, 文学部, 助教授 (20214554)
能智 正博 東京大学, 大学院・総合文化研究科, 助手 (30292717)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1998 – 2000
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2000)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥2,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000)
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| Keywords | Decision Making / Utility Evaluation / Subjective Probability / Wason's four card task / Secretary Problem / 数理モデル / 合理的評価 / 意志決定 |
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| Research Abstract |
Conflicts and resolutions between normative models and descriptive models have been our research concern. For example, some mathematical aggregation rule and simple majority rule were compared in terms of efficiency in the group decision-making situation. For public decision making, the methodology to measure what people actually have in mind is very important and we investigated the possibility to apply the method of measuring subjective probability by means of language expression.
Our feeling is that our ordinary decision making purports to reach some kind of rationality. From this point, we tried to find the justification for the subjects' typical responses, which are often regarded as the wrong responses. More concretely, we made three research efforts to investigate how this affects subjects change in the sequential responses. One is the experiment using Wason's four card problem. We showed that mathematical normative model predicts that when the prior probability is small and the rule itself is probabilistic, typical "wrong" responses can be justified, although real subjects' data did not show the clear tendency to meet this normative prediction. Also, we showed that in the sequential decision making task known as the "secretary problem", subjects' responses became closer to the rational solution. In the third task, Damasio's "gamble task", it was shown that whether subjects approached the normative solution or not depended subjects emotional responses which was measured by skin conductance responses.
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