The Function of Dissenting Opinions at the International Court of Justice

Research Project

Project/Area Number	10620028
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Section	一般
Research Field	International law
Research Institution	KYOTO UNIVERSITY
Principal Investigator	SUGIHARA Takane Kyoto University, Graduate School of Law, Professor, 大学院・法学研究科, 教授 (30004154)
Project Period (FY)	1998 – 1999
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 1999)
Budget Amount *help	¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000) Fiscal Year 1999: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000) Fiscal Year 1998: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
Keywords	International Court of Justice / international adjudication / judgment / dissenting opinion / separate opinion / advisory opinion / 判決 / 裁判の評決 / 勧告的意見
Research Abstract	The present research has examined functions of the system of dissenting and separate opinions which are attached to a judgment of the International Court of Justice. The system was first introduced at the Permanent Court of International Justice, the predecessor of the present Court, in overcoming a strong opposition to it. The opponents asserted that the system of dissenting opinions would inevitably undermine the moral force of the judgment (majority opinion), hence the judicial authority of the Court. The practice of the both Courts, however, has proved much usefulness of the system rather than its detrimental effect. First, the system of expressing separate and dissenting opinions contributes the dynamic development of international law by incorporating the diversity of approach in a judgment to be rendered by the Court. Second, it serves to clarify the substantial meaning of various portions of the judgment which are at times left in ambiguity. On the other hand, there is a problem to be considered. As far as the present Court concerned, there is a growing tendency in which dissenting judges are, through their individual opinions, inclined to making an attack on legal reasoning of the Court. This is a problem which the old Court had never experienced. It is to be noted that, as Article 57 of the Court's Statute suggests, the purpose of dissenting opinions is to solely indicate the reasons for which a judge is not in agreement with the majority, not to embark himself in expressing a reasoned criticism to the judgment to which his opinion attached.