| Project/Area Number |
10630012
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | KYUSHU UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
HOSOE Moriki Kyushu University, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (20140832)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KUSUDA Yasuyuki Nagasaki University, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (60253689)
MIURA Isao Kyushu University, Faculty of Economics, Associate Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (30239173)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1998 – 1999
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1999)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Keywords | anti-trust law / mlchamism Design / Cartel detenamce Policy / Momitoring / Public Biddinge / Mengen Policy / Hold-up / Tying in sale / Tying in Sale / 法と経済学 / カルテル抑止メカニズム |
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| Research Abstract |
Performances obtained in our two-year research were as follows.
(1)An optimal design of general regulatory system was analysed on the basis of information and incentive approach. In particular, the condition under where a hierachical regulation was more efficient than a direct regulation was found.
(2)An enforcement policy of cartel deterrence was considered under a repeated competition game. The structure of penalty policy and monitoring policy was explicitly showned.
(3)Public bidding rules was evaluated form the point of view of anti-trust law. Researvation prices of the participants was showned to become lower than in the case of competitive market in the case that collusion was possible.
(4)An welfare analysis of horizontal merger in an oligopolistic market was done. An acquisitonagainst inefficient firm was showned to increase the social welfare when negative synergy effect of merger existed.
(5)The efficiency problem of exclusive dealings was analysed as a hold-up problem in cooperative investment. As result, expected damage rule was showned to induce more efficient transaction than liquidated damage rule when entrants had market power and the renegotitiation was impossible.
(6)Illegality of tying in sale was examined from the point of view of welfare analysis. A firm with a market power in a market was showned to have a trend to make an influence on another market, in particular , a vertical market and increase the social welfare.
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