| Project/Area Number |
10630013
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
|
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| Research Institution | Keio University |
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Principal Investigator |
KAWAMATA Kunio Keio University, Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (30051569)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1998 – 1999
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 1999)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1998: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
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| Keywords | contribution of a Firm / free Entry / excessive entry / auction / Supermodularity / network / complete graph / coalition formation / 独占的競争 / 対安定性 / インセンティブ / 効率性 / 垂直的統合 / 接続料金 / 参入企業数 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
In the article ''On the Efficiency and Stability of Networks" we examined the relationships between the incentive for the links formation and the efficiency of the resulting networks. Although it is desirable that networks are both efficient and stable, these two objectives are often incompatible. Imposing reasonable requirements we give conditions under which this conflict is avoided.
In the article "Optimal Entry and Marginal Contribution of Players" we defined the concept of the "marginal contribution of a firm" as the difference between the maximum welfare with the firm and that without it. It is established that
(I) in the competitive market, the contribution of a firm equals the profit of the firm,
(ii) in the monopolistic competition market, the contribution of the firm less than the profit, and that
(iii) entry is excessive in such a market.
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