| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Research Abstract |
Two problems have been considered in order to construct a naturalistic theory of consciousness : the problem of naturalizing qualia and that of elucidating the nature of unconscious cognitive process. The results are the following.
1. Conscious experiences have two kinds of features, namely, intrinsic features and intentional ones. Qualia are intentional features of experiences, not intrinsic ones. The fact that an experience has a certain intentional content is explained by the fact that it has a certain function. Therefore qualia as the intrinsic features of an experience are reduced to its function.
2. Conscious experiences are conscious because they have qualia. But, if qualia are nothing but intentional features, experiences are not necessarily conscious. For there can be unconscious experiences which have the same intentional features. Qualia must be conscious intentional features. The fact that qualia are conscious can be explained by the fact that they are available to verbalization. Language is the source of consciousness. Organisms without any language lack consciousness.
3. Conscious thinking is classical computationalistic because it is a linguistic process. On the other hand, unconscious thinking is connectionisitic. It is a process of transforming activation patterns of neurons. For example, judgements of good and evil or of grammaticalilty are classical computaionalistic in the case of being made consciously, but connectionistic in the case of being made intuitively. But, even in the case of conscious inference, everyday inference is usually full of logical gap. Strictly speaking, it is not classical computationalisitic.
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