STUDY ON ACQUSITION OF THE MORAL CONCEPT WORDS
| Project/Area Number |
11610009
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Philosophy
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| Research Institution | KYUSHU UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
KAN Toyohiko Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University Prof., 大学院・人文科学研究院, 教授 (50091385)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1999 – 2001
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2001)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
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| Keywords | MORAL REALISM / VIRTUE / DESIRE / AKRASIA / KNOWLEDGE / 認知主義 / 人為的徳 / 道徳的感受性 / 投影説 / 誤謬説 / 共約不可能性 / 収集 / 道徳的反実在論 / 理性 / 行為 / 情念 / 定言的命法 / モラル・センス |
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| Research Abstract |
I criticized some suppositions which support the theory that analyzes the motive into <belief and desirer>. Through this criticism, I asserted that the actor's judgement of the situation is enough to constitue his motive in the case of moral motive, and that the actor's ethos reflects his motivation. Then I tried to support Socrates' thesis that <virtue is knowledge>.
I also investigated Aristotles' interpretation of akrasia in order to support the Socrates' thesis. Socrates' thesis seems to include the negation of akrasia, but we ordinarily realize our own akrasia, that is, <what I will to do, that I do not practice; but what I hate that I do>.
Then, how we resolve Socrates' paradox? This is the problem for Aristotle. I thought that 20th centuries main stream of interpretation of Aristotle's analyses of akrasia includes some premises of modern moral philosophy misleadingly. So I gave some concrete examples of these points, and tried to support Socrates' thesis that <virtue is knowledge>.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(10 results)
