Social psychological study of adaptive bases of sharing rules
Project/Area Number |
11610096
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
教育・社会系心理学
|
Research Institution | HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY |
Principal Investigator |
KAMEDA Tatsuya Hokkaido Univ., Grad. School of Let., Prof., 大学院・文学研究科, 教授 (20214554)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
大沼 進 北海道大学, 文学部, 助手 (80301860)
|
Project Period (FY) |
1999 – 2001
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2001)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
|
Keywords | Uncertainty / Resource sharing / Evolutionary game / Evolutionarily Stable Strategy / Generalized exchange / 分配 / 適応 / コンピュータ・シミュレーション / 心理実験 / 人類学 |
Research Abstract |
This study examined adaptive bases of social sharing rules from an evolutionary perspective. As repeatedly found in anthropology and sociology, social exchange and sharing of important resources with others constitute a core element of human group life. We conducted a series of computer simulations and evolutionary game modeling to explore adaptive values of social sharing, and then submitted the theses derived from the modeling for empirical tests by a series of psychological/behavioral experiments. The game modeling revealed that, when resource-acquisition is highly uncertain, a communal-sharing strategy that designates the resource for public goods is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Cross-national experiments using American as well as Japanese participants provided some empirical supports for this thesis, revealing that human sharing tendency is highly contingent upon the degree of uncertainties involved in resource acquisition.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(22 results)