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A Break-Down of the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem of Auctions : Theoretical and Experimental Approach

Research Project

Project/Area Number 11630006
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Section一般
Research Field 経済理論
Research InstitutionShinshu University

Principal Investigator

YAMAMOTO-NISHIMURA Naoko  Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University Associate Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (30218200)

Project Period (FY) 1999 – 2000
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2000)
Budget Amount *help
¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
KeywordsAuction / Revenue Equivalence Theorem / Allais Paradox / Non-Expected Utility / Experiment / Risk / Allais型 / リスク選択行動
Research Abstract

In an independent private value (IPV) setting, we investigate the relation between the nature of individual preference and the bidding behavior in an English auction and in a second-price auction, theoretically as well as experimentally. These two auction forms are equivalent under the expected utility. We derive the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies for bidders with smooth non-expected utility preferences under these two auction forms for a risky auctioned object. Under the Hypothesis II by Machina (1982), a sufficient condition for the Allais type, we show that the equilibrium revenue under the second-price auction is lower than the English auction. When we narrow down the set of preferences to betweenness-conforming preferences, weak behavioral conditions that are more empirically validated can implement the higher equilibrium revenue in English auction.
Based upon our theoretical analysis, we introduce a preference experiment additionally to auction experiment. We classify bidders … More in terms of whether they exhibit the expected utility or Allais type choice patterns. Conditional bid data on the expected utility type bidders support the conventional equivalence. Whereas, conditional on the Allais type bidders, the bid difference between the two kinds of auctions remain insignificant for a deterministic auctioned object, but the bids for the English auction are significantly higher than for the second-price auction, when the auctioned object is risky. These findings are consistent with our theoretical analysis.
In a similar manner, we investigate the relation between the Dutch auction and the first-price auction. Unlike the expected utility type, the conditional data on the Allis type bidders show significantly lower Dutch bids, which is contrary to our theoretical result. This conflicting result may be attributed to the Hypothesis II being only sufficient condition for the Allais type. This prompts a further investigation for a better characterization of the Allais type choice behavior, as a future research. Less

Report

(3 results)
  • 2000 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report Summary
  • 1999 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (5 results)

All Other

All Publications (5 results)

  • [Publications] Chew Soo Hong & Naoko Nishimura: "Revenue Non-Equivalence Between the English and the Second-Price Auctions : Experimental Evidence"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming..

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
    • Related Report
      2000 Final Research Report Summary
  • [Publications] Chew Soo Hong & Naoko Nishimura: ""Equilibrium Bidding Strategies under the English and the Second-Price Auctions", in Experimental Business Research, A.Rapoport and R.Zwick (eds.),"Kluwer Publishers (in press)..

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
    • Related Report
      2000 Final Research Report Summary
  • [Publications] Chew Soo Hong & Naoko Nishimura: "Revenue Non-Equivalence Between the English and the Second-Price Auctions : Experimental Evidence"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. (forthcoming). (2001)

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
    • Related Report
      2000 Final Research Report Summary
  • [Publications] Chew Soo Hong & Naoko Nishimura: ""Equilibrium Bidding Strategies under the English and the Second-Price Auctions", Experimental Business Research"A.Rapoport and R.Zwick (eds.)(in press) Kluwer Publishers..

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
    • Related Report
      2000 Final Research Report Summary
  • [Publications] Chew Soo Hong & Naoko Nishimura: "Revenue Non-Equivalence Between the English and the Second-Price Auctions : Experimental Evidence"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.. (Forthcoming.).

    • Related Report
      2000 Annual Research Report

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Published: 1999-04-01   Modified: 2016-04-21  

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