| Project/Area Number |
11630017
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | Keio University |
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Principal Investigator |
GREVE Takako Keio University, Dept.of Economics, Associate professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (10219040)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
GREVE Henrich r. University of Tsukuba, Inst.of Policy and Planning Science, Associate professor, 社会工学系, 助教授 (60280905)
AKABAYASHI Hideo Keio University, Dept.of Economics, Associate professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (90296731)
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| Project Period (FY) |
1999 – 2000
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2000)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000)
Fiscal Year 1999: ¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
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| Keywords | Labor / Game Theory / Data / Expectation / Reputation / Household / Tax / ゲーム / ジョブサーチ / 賃金 / 戦略 |
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| Research Abstract |
We analyzed strategic labor supply using game theory as one of the main tools. Our basic idea is that both workers and firms behave strategically by looking at the wage distribution and tax and other institutions that affect one's income, and that workers and firm maximize lone-term benefits. In the first year of the project. we developed a game model in which firms try to build good reputations to reduce turnover rate and workers search for better jobs under uncertainty. We also considered a special situation in Japan where spouses income influences the main earners' tax reduction. In these models, labor supply is determined not only by the wage (price) but also by strategic concern. We collected US and Japanese data on individual workers' labor supply behavior.
In the second year of the project we tested our strategic labor market model. The results strongly support that labor supply is not solely based on the wage (price). From US data analysis, we found that firm size distribution a
… More
ffects labor mobility. Thus workers react to firms' reputation signaled by the size. From Japanese data analysis, we found that wives adjust their labor supply to reduce husband's income tax. We also published an analysis from Norwegian data based on the same theoretical model. Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Henrich Greve (2000) "Organizational Ecology and Job Mobility" Social Forces 79 (2) : 547-568. Other analyses are also summarized in manuscripts such as : Hideo Akabayashi "How do Japanese Wives Respond to the Allowance for Spouses? A Structural Estimate of Labor Supply and a Test of Unitary Household Model" mimeo Keio University.
Our model is new in the sense that the game structure allows voluntary partner changes which has not been analyzed before. Our empirical results are significant in the sense that (i) we found strong evidence that labor supply is strategic and outside opportunities and institutions matter (not like a simple supply function based on wages). and (ii) it casts doubt on unitary household theory. Less
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