| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
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| Research Abstract |
Theoretical Achievements : The conditions for the emergence of social order, the properties of the emerged social order, and the dynamic of the emergence are analyzed with the help of evolutionary game theory. The social order is defined as an evolutionarily stable state and/or a stochastically stable state as well as a Nash equilibrium. The agents are assumed to make imperfectly rational decision (i.e., bounded rationality) under uncertainty (i.e., imperfect information).
In concrete, one of the situations analyzed is what is called Ultimatum Game. I analyzed how a rule of cooperative equal division emerges in a dispute-like social interaction. Another situation analyzed is the consumer contract ; how cooperative trusting social order emerges in a state of nature (i.e., dog eats dog). I also analyzed the conditions for dispute settlement through lawyer negotiation (i.e., conditions for cooperative strategy selection).
empirical Achievements : I conducted a questionnaire survey to 400 randomly sampled citizens in Kanto area. The questions are about people's knowledge, attitude, and evaluations on ADR and court procedures. The methodology is what is called vignette study with ANOVA. The vignettes include a product liability case, a traffic accident case, and a dishonest taxi driver case.
I also included questions about WTP (willingness to pay) and WTA (willingness to accept) in terms of money and time for dispute resolution. This is to reveal whether courts are really costly and whether ADRs are really cheap.
By this survey, I find how people make decision on using ADR and courts when faced with a dispute. Thus the ways to enhance people's access to justice are suggested.
With the theoretical and empirical achievements stated above, I shed lights on the social functions of ADR and socio-economic conditions for dispute resolution mechanisms to function in the rule-oriented society.
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