| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000)
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| Research Abstract |
During the two-year period between April 2000-March 2002, the investigators have jointly conducted theoretical and empirical research on the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The initial purpose of the research was to test the utility of rational-choice models that had been developed to explain the results of domestic adjudication. Our research included extensive interviews not only at the WTO secretariat but also at the US government and the EU headquarters.
The findings over the past two years are too extensive to be summarized in a short space, but many of them fall under the rubric of the causes and effects of the increasing legalization of the world trading system. With the establishment of the WTO, the multilateral trading system has become highly legalized, and one of the causes (or purposes) turns out to be the management of domestic politics. In other words, policy makers have found out that a legalized system at the international level is useful for facilitating domestic economics adjustments. In terms of the effects of legalization, we have found that legalization provides a more level playing field and a higher degree of compliance. Because the GATT dispute settlement system was a very diplomatic approach, there was room for national power to affect the results of disputes to a large degree. The legalized system at the WTO has an effect of attenuating power asymmetry. Also, while the GATT system left something to be desired in terms of rule compliance, the WTO seems to be accompanied by a higher degree of compliance, albeit with some exceptions.
Theoretically, while the models that assume nation-states to be unitary, rational actors prove useful to some extent, as we had expected, it has become increasing clear that it is necessary to take into account the effects of various domestic constraints to understand the nature of dispute settlement at the WTO.
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