| Project/Area Number |
12630002
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | Tohoku University |
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Principal Investigator |
HORI Hajime Gradua School of Economics and Management, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (90004209)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
AKITA Jiro Gradua School of Economics and Management, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (10302069)
MIYAKE Mitsunobu Gradua School of Economics and Management, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (00190752)
KAMOIKE Osamu Gradua School of Economics and Management, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (60004199)
SERIZAWA Shigehiro Gradua School of Economics and Management, Associate Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 助教授 (90252717)
HAYASHIYAMA Yasuhisa Gradua School of Economics and Management, Associate Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 助教授 (20260531)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2000 – 2002
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2002)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Keywords | Mechanism Design / Non-Paternalistic Altruism / Indivisible Good / Global Warming / Environmental Problem / Optimal BIS Banking Regulation / Knightian Uncertainty / Incentive |
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| Research Abstract |
1) The analysis of non-paternalistic altruism is extended to a dynamic model.
2) The effect of banks' equity ratio on their profits is analyzed in order to investigate the optimal BIS banking regulation. It in shown that there is a trade-off between the expected rote of return of equity and the probability of bankruptcy.
3) A finite algorithm to compute a competitive equilibrium in derived in a discrete land market model.
4) CDM in Kyoto mechanism (of Kyoto Protocol) is analyzed.
5) The total value of utilizing environment is formulated in terms of compensation bias and equivalent bias, and it is shown that the total value can be represented in an additive form of utilizing value and non utilizing value, and that utilizing value is decomposed into direct utilizing value and net indirect utilizing value.
6) It is shown by using Knightian uncertainty that higher uncertainty decreases reservation prices.
7) It is empirically shown that directors have more incentive to pursue share holders' profit is firms managed by owners than firms managed by non-owners.
8) It is shown that there is a trade-off between Pareto-efficiency and minimum consumption guarantee if strategy-proofness is imposed on mechanisms in pure exchange economies.
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