| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Research Abstract |
(1) We considered a simpler model of the formation of coalition induced from a theoretical model, and designed an economic experiment. By aid of a graduate student of Hokkaido University, Mr. Terai, a computer program for the experiment was completed. It works on a network, and it is very easy to handle several experiments.
(2) We performed economic experiments by using the above program on 7/30/2000, 7/31/2001, 10/11/2001, 11/24/2001(2 times), 2/2/2002. In each experiment, 15 students of Waseda University participated. First three experiments were performed for the preparation to find bugs of the program and defects of the procedure of the experiment. Last three experiments were main experiments and analyzed in detail. In the result, non cooperative behavior is found frequently contrary to the theoretical prediction.
(3) We had regular seminars where many researchers were invited and many related issues were discussed. These outcomes had influence on the theoretical research of (4).
(4) The head investigator, Funaki, summarizes the theoretic results as a paper entitled "The Core and Consistency Properties : A General Characterization." This paper was published in the International Game Theory Review. This paper was presented at the First World Congress of the International Game Theory Society. The investigator, Araki, summarizes the theoretic results as a paper entitled "Evolutionary Interpretations of Mixed Strategy." The related topics were presented at the same world congress and the Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting.
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