The Philosophy of Value and the Limits of Realism : An Inquiry into Practical Truth
| Project/Area Number |
13610010
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Philosophy
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| Research Institution | Kumamoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
OKABE Tsutomu Kumamoto University, Faculty of Letters, Professor, 文学部, 教授 (50117339)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2003
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2003)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
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| Keywords | Value / Truth / Realism / Metaphysics / Rationality / Cognitivism / Socrates / Paul Grice / 言語 / 反自然主義 / P.Grice / P. Grice / D. Charles / アリストテレス / 合理性 / 構成主義 / 価値論 / モラル・リアリズム / 行為 / 反実在論 / ソクラテス |
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| Research Abstract |
A moral realist would say moral reasoning is a kind of practical reasoning which requires flat rationality and aims at deliberative truth. He might add that this kind of practical reasoning, moral reasoning, does not exclude some types of theoretical reasoning ; and that flat rationality means the basic kind of rationality which every rational person would claim to have. He may be a Socratic layman type of rationalist and also a non-cognitivist.
D.Wiggins has tried to limit the demand for convergence on deliberative truth ; and he always emphasizes the cognitive aspects of our dispositional responses to the situations we are confronted with. He seems to be assuming that each individual's cognitive abilities can be differently realized, in different degrees, according to her upbringing, experiences, cultivation, on the one hand, and his concerns, interests, occupations, and so on, on the other.
B.Williams denies we can acquire knowledge of moral affairs through deliberative reflection ; but he does not deny reflective argument can play a meaningful role in our making decision of the course of action. He may not deny even that reflective argument would be a sole rationally effective way to reach conclusive decision among antagonistic parties for modernized rational people. He does deny our acquisition of moral knowledge.
Now you can imagine a realist of another kind. Paul Grice's fanciful Kantotle is a remarkably sophisticated metaphysician, not in the least a layman, by comparison with whom, in the last instance, I'd like to judge the position of our Socratic layman. Kantotle is surely a possible working model for a modern moral realist.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(9 results)
