| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This research tries to examine the legal problems which can take place in the exercise of stockholders rights when it is done by the various funds which should represent the individual who invest their money in that funds collectively.
First, when a stock was chosen as the target of investments, it should consider how the shareholders rights carry out their governance programs and proxy voting. In other words, because of the existence of plural investors whose intentions may be different, it is expected that fund might be use disunity system about voting rights under the Japanese Company Law.
On the other hand, each fund does not intend to commit the management of the corporation but earned capital gain, so that funds sometime did not use their proxy voting.
However, under the condition of the long-term inactivity of the stock prices, the Statistics about general meetings in Japan show that the investment advisors, the public pension funds and other institutional investors start to the stockholder behavior that are based on the corporate governance.
The corporate governance debate which focuses on this research comes from the discusses of the American pension funds, for example about CaLPERS, and that influences the Japanese institutional investors to use the voting rights.
Now, the growing interest in proxy voting is a clear indication that the debate is now not on the need for change, but on the role that institutions have to play in any new system..
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