| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This research aimed at the following two objectives: First, to analyze characteristics of the non-proliferation regime in comparison with other arms-control and disarmament regimes; Second, to analyze the, conditions under which abolition of nuclear weapons becomes feasible. Due regard was paid to the current strategic debates regarding the role of nuclear weapons, and the trends toward arms-control and disarmament after the end of the Cold War.
Regarding the first objective, I made a following analysis : (1) All the existing nuclear-weapons states regard the possession of nuclear weapons as the vital element in their national security strategy. (2) There is a wide-spread belief in the effectiveness and utility of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear weapon is regarded as the ultimate weapon to preserve international peace. (3) Given the faith in nuclear deterrence, the existing regime of nuclear non-proliferation does not aim at nuclear abolition ; it merely aims at non-proliferation.
Regarding the second objective, the following points were explained, (l) In order to explore the ways towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, we need to criticize the nuclear deterrence theory and faith in it, since the theory is the foundation on which people legitimize the continued possession of nuclear weapons. (2) There are alternative ideas to nuclear deterrence as a way to preserve international peace. I examined an idea to form a universal regime, probably without nuclear weapons states as its member, which bans the possession of nuclear weapons, and its role in international politics. I also examined a practical idea of nuclear marginalization with particular focus on 'virtual nuclear arsenal.' (3) Notwithstanding many good ideas regarding the abolition of nuclear weapons, what is lacking is strong political initiative to realize it. Given the existing reality of international political situation, such political initiative may come only after the failure of nuclear deterrence.
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