| Project/Area Number |
13630009
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
OKADA Akira Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, Professor, 経済研究所, 教授 (90152298)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2003
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2003)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
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| Keywords | game theory / cooperation / coalition formation / bargaining / evolutionary game / Nash equilibrium / global warming / Kyoto protocol / 組織 / 交渉ゲーム |
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| Research Abstract |
The aim of this research is to investigate conditions and mechanisms for voluntary cooperation and coalition formation among economic agents pursuing their own values, by applying new methodologies in game theory. The research consists of the following three topics about voluntary cooperation and coalition formation.
(1) noncooperative bargaining models for cooperation and coalition formation
We present a noncooperative sequential bargaining model for a general n-person strategic game where cooperation by a group of players may induce externality to other players. We first define a new notion of the core, called the Nash core, of the n-person strategic game. The Nash-core is defined by a new notion of effectiveness of a payoff allocation, which is based on the idea that when a coalition forms, a response by, the compliment coalition should be consistent with the Nash bargaining solution of their negotiations. We prove that the largest group of players forms in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining model if and only if the Nash bargaining solution of the game belongs to the Nash core. Moreover, negotiations result in the Nash bargaining solution outcome. We design and conduct bargaining experiments to test theoretical predictions. We show that bargaining outcomes of coalition formation are substantially influenced by reciprocal behavior of subjects.
(2) evolutionary analysis of group formation
We present an evolutionary game model for group formation in the collective action problem and investigate how heterogeneous preferences affect a long-run equilibrium for group formation.
(3) economic applications
We apply theoretical models developed in the research to international negotiations on climate change in the Kyoto protocol. We investigate how noncooperative bargaining models can explain the C02 emissions reduction agreed in the Kyoto protocol, based on actual data about emissions by EU, Former Soviet Union, Japan and USA.
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