KOBAYASHI Masaya CHIBA UNIVERSITY, LAW & ECONOMICS, PROFESSOR, 法経学部, 教授 (60186773)
KATO Junko TOKYO UNIVERSITY, LAW & ECONOMOCS, PROFESSOR, 大学院・法学政治学研究科, 教授 (00251314)
OGAWA Ariyoshi RIKYO UNIVERSITY, LAW, PROFESSOR, 法学部, 教授 (70241932)
TANAKA Zenichiro TOKYO INSITTUTUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, PROFESSOR, 社会理工学研究科, 教授 (30009823)
村上 信一郎 神戸市外国語大学, 外国学部, 教授 (10305675)
|Budget Amount *help
¥12,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥12,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥5,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥7,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥7,100,000)
This joint research has dealt with political corruption and clientelism of the developed countries (Japan, Korea, Italy, and the Nordic countries) and of the EU from a comparative perspective.
While corruption is primarily characterized by its illegality, independence and horizontality aomong corrupted actors are not uncommon. On the other hand, clientelism largely takes on asymmetric, subordinate, vertical, and even legal ties.
A line of modernization theory, not having paid much attention to the distinction between them, has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre modern social structure and could be referred to as pathologic phenomenon of the political system.
All of us have been seriously engaged in their theoretical and / or positive researches. This academic endeavor as a whole produced the following findings : modernization theory cannot well grasp the gist of corruption problem, namely the permeated corrupted actions as "hidden" and "negative" exchanges even in the, advanced countries and the EU ; corruption appears as a variety of actions like bribery, embezzment, fraud,oblique voting, vote buying, patronage, and violated corruption among political parties, factions, politicians, bureaucrats, corporations, and organized cirmes (e. g., mafia) mainly in the interest mediation and in the eelctoral process severe punishment, strengthening legal restriction, eudcating officials morally, reform of electoral system, and decentralization of government power are not sufficiently effective for controlling corruption.