| Project/Area Number |
14390044
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
広領域
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Metropolitan University |
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Principal Investigator |
HAGIHARA Kiyoko Tokyo Metropolitan University, Graduate School of Urban Science, Professor, 大学院・都市科学研究科, 教授 (00198649)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
HAGIHARA Yoshimi Kyoto University, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Professor, 防災研究所, 教授 (00268567)
SAKAI Akira University of Marketing and Distribution Science, Faculty of Service Industry, Professor, サービス産業学部, 教授 (20299126)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2004
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2004)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥2,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥2,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000)
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| Keywords | environmental pollution risk / risk management / economic valuation / urban area / risk perception of people / risk sharing / 水質汚染リスク / バングラデシュ / ヒ素 / 衛生改善技術 / 水質リスク / エージェンシー理論 / リスク分担制度 / 事後的マネジメント / 情報の非対称性 / モラルハザード / 支払い意思額 / 土壌汚染 / ノンポイントソース |
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| Research Abstract |
The possible risk management process and control options of rainfall-related risks were discussed after a summary of both the similar and differing points between inundation risk and environmental pollution risk. As a result, it was deemed necessary to operate a scheme to raise the rainfall-related environmental risk perception level of urban residents to ensure their participation in risk management.
We showed a model that takes into account a bounded rationality on the ability of risk perception, information situation, and people's threshold acceptance of risk. Marginal willingness to pay for public investment is high when there is no or little averting behavior. Moreover, it was shown that consumers' perception of risk is largely dependent on information on risk, countermeasures taken by public authorities, and overconfidence in private averting goods. We developed the model of risk sharing systems for these costs; a kind of pollution insurance system for regional public sectors which supply municipal water.
In the model based on the contract theory, optimal condition for the insurance contract were investigated, which determined the rule for efficient level of insurance and investment level in purification system. Applying the standard analytical process for the asymmetric information to the model, we had an implication that the investment level for purification system and insurance distributed could be supplied excessively when the level of contamination at each region is private information of the regional body. Considering that the inefficiency associated with the contamination risk sharing system could be serious, the efficiency of the risk sharing system should be compared with the implication of other ex post allocation systems.
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