| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Research Abstract |
One of the most outstanding phenomena in the current international community is the proliferation of international judicial organs, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Criminal Court and others. The reason for the creation of such tribunals lies in the political domain and in practical necessity. All these tribunals, in common with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), exist in isolation, having no kind of hierarchy or system that governs their mutual relations. This fact caused concern that the tribunals might make contradictory decisions, thus entailing increasing dangers of fragmentation of international law. A number of international lawyers emphasize this danger. At the same time, there is an opposing view to this. Some commentators point out that there is plausibility in the proposition that competition between tribunals will if anything strengthen the jurisprudence and will be healthy for legal process. They also suggest that, even if there arises lines of irreconcilable decisions among different tribunals on the same subject of international law, the principle "magna est veritas et praevalebit" will prevail.
Although, so far, danger of this kind has not become imminent, a comparison between judicial decisions, for example, in the Nicaragua case of the ICJ and in the Tadic case of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugislavia (Appeals Chamber) on the same subject matter expels the optimistic point of view referred to above. With the proliferation and increasing activities of various kind of tribunals, the danger for international law may be expected to become serious. If such a tendency really comes with times, a legal device will surely be required to combat this situation. This requirement will be best met by authorizing the ICJ to assume the function of a court of appeal, just as a supreme court in the international community, to ensure the unity of international law.
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