| Project/Area Number |
14520042
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Civil law
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| Research Institution | HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
TAMURA Yoshiyuki Hokkaido Univ., Grad.School of Law, Prof., 大学院・法学研究科, 教授 (20197586)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
YANAGAWA Noriyuki The Univ.of Tokyo, Grad.School of Econ., Asso.Prof., 大学院・経済学研究科, 助教授 (80255588)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
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| Keywords | Copyright / Patent / Biotechnology / Exhaustion / Employee Inventions / Repair and Reconstruction / Law and Economics / Intellectual Property Law / インターネット / クリック・オン契約 / 補償金請求権 |
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| Research Abstract |
The research examined first various theoretical frameworks of intellectual property law and economics. Especially, the research assessed the prospect theory of intellectual property which argues in favor of granting rights covering intermediate results of intellectual creation even before they reach the market, so as to prevent rent seeking, ex post. The research finds that this understanding emphases only single aspect of the relationship between intellectual property and the market, and downplays the observation that the protection at the early stage of intellectual creation would motivate rent seeking ex ante (i.e.race to patent). In addition, the research found that as long as the exclusive right itself creates costs, intellectual property law should be tailored and developed in a more industry specific manner.
When the above general research findings are applied to specific practices, especially the following observation is made ;
Concerning employee inventions, when we consider the legislative intent of the section 35 of the Japanese patent act, the remuneration should provide a proper incentive to inventive activities of both employers and employees. In this context, taking wealth effect into account, the compensation to the employee as a share of benefit may be reduced, in case where the absolute amount becomes too large. This would provide incentives to those who contribute to the inventive activities within the same organization, other than the inventor. The research suggested that even when the share of benefit for the employee is reduced, as the wealth effect allows the same level of incentives to the employee inventor, the share which would otherwise be attributed to the employee inventor may remain with the employer so that the benefit may be further distributed by the market via employment contract.
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