| Project/Area Number |
14580495
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
社会システム工学
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| Research Institution | Kansai University |
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Principal Investigator |
NAKAI Teruhisa Kansai University, Faculty of Engineering, Professor, 工学部, 教授 (20029557)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2003
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2003)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
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| Keywords | Repeated Game / Information Operation / Value Inclination / Market Game / Nash Equilibrium / Bargaining Game / Subjective Game / Motive Distribution / 部分ゲーム完全ナッシュ均衡 / 不完備情報ゲーム / 新規参入問題 / 売買交渉ゲーム / 寡占市場 / 停止確率行列 / 不完備情報 / ナッシュ均衡点 / 効用関数 |
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| Research Abstract |
We have obtained the following four research results :
1.We obtain the optimal solution for the information operation problem, which is the main purpose of this research, in a repeated game by n firms and the optimal information operation in the case of considering value inclinations of all firms. But it has been left unsolved to analyze the learning process for the value inclination of the opponent.
2.We obtain the optimal solution(the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) for a leader-followers market game in which the price difference effects on their shares. Furthermore considering the case of incomplete information, we obtain the condition creation of motive of repricing arid applying these results to the new entry problem, we clarify the process that the repricings converge to a stable equilibrium.
3.In a bargaining game the bargaining power of the buyer up to now has been considered to be known. We consider the case that both players have asymmetric informations with respect to the power and obtain the linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
4.The Nash equilibrium point(NEP) is used widely in the area of micro-economics, but when a nonzero-sum game has plural NEPs, it can't become a principle of selecting a desirable strategy. Furthermore even if the NEP is unique, in a real game there are many players who don't select it Then we propose the SEMD(the selection of an equilibrium by motive distributions) method selecting one from all NEPs of all subjective games which correspond to the combination of various motives for selecting a strategy. Thus we can explain the variety in selection of a desirable strategy.
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