Management of voluntary Federations as Autonomous and Cooperative Systems
| Project/Area Number |
14597005
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
非営利・共同組織
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Kushiro Public University of Economics |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
NISHIMURA Tomoyuki Kushiro Public University of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Associate Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (30325881)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2004
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2004)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | Voluntary Federation / Autonomous and Cooperative System / In-house Incentive / Take-out Incentive / Collective Action / Association / Bureaucracy / 自立協働システム / 誘因と貢献 / 誘因-貢献のバランス / テイクアウト誘因 / 有効性 / 戦略 / ガバナンス |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
In this study the concept of "autonomous and cooperative system" is offered as the prior scheme for analyzing the management of voluntary federations. An autonomous and cooperative system consists of two sub-domains the domain of autonomy in which members engage in their daily jobs and the domain of cooperation in which coordinated effort by the members is done. From that viewpoint, two types of incentives for motivating members to cooperate can be identified : (a) "in-house incentives" as satisfaction that members feel within the domain of cooperation, and (b) "take-out incentives" to be brought back to the domain of autonomy from the domain of cooperation. A model analysis indicated that the take-out incentives are critical.
The other arguments made in this study were as follows.
(1) Students participated in an experiment and were regarded as members of a voluntary federation, and effects of the above two types of incentives on willingness to cooperate were tested. Results showed that
… More
(a) members generally were attracted to take-out incentives, (b) but "leisure" members who were not so busy in the daily jobs as compared to the group of "busy" members tended to be attracted to in-house incentives, (c) there was no difference in the degree of willingness to cooperate between the leisure group and the busy group.
(2) Mancur Olson's logic of collective action which had different opinions from this study was reconsidered, and some faults in and remedies for the former were manifested.
(3) Voluntary federations as "ideal types" have no staffs, but there are substantial amount of staffs in reality. By using data about incorporated associations, it was shown that the number of staffs in associations was determined by (a) size of associations (the number of regular members, and the amount of income), (b) age, (c) relationships with government office, and (d) number of services offered. Furthermore, the research showed that associations having a large number of staffs adopted intensive technologies rather than mediating technologies.
(4) For voluntary federations to continue and survive, they must not only draw contribution from members, but also maintain the solvency. Strategy, structure, and leadership for survival of voluntary federations were discussed. Less
|
Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(10 results)
