| Project/Area Number |
15330036
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
MATSUSHIMA Hitoshi The University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (00209545)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥10,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥10,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥3,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥3,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000)
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| Keywords | Implementation / Mechanism design / Moral Preference / Auction / Market Microstructure / Detail-Free Mechanism / Incentive / Game Theory / mechanism design / implementation / honesty / market microstructure / group incentive / repeated games / Nash equilibrium / game theory |
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| Research Abstract |
I investigated the possibility of collusion and competition by using the approaches of mechanism design and repeated games. I took into account explicitly the fact that real individuals do not necessarily behave for their own material interests, the fact that they are influenced by information about factors irrelevant to their material interests, and the fact that they use private information and are limited to access public information. The most important contributions are the paper entitled "Repeated Games with Private monitoring : Two Players," which was published in Econometrica as a regular article and the paper entitled "Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance", which was accepted in Journal of Economic Theory as a regular article. Both journals are top among the economics theory journals. Other papers such as "Role of Honesty in Implementation" is related to the issue of the problem of factors other than the material interests. The papers entitled "Detail-Free Mechanism design and Rationality", which was published in Japanese Economic Review, was written as the lecture article for the Nakahana Awards of the Japanese economic association.
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