| Project/Area Number |
15510133
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Social systems engineering/Safety system
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| Research Institution | Kagawa University |
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Principal Investigator |
SHISHIDO Harunori Kagawa University, Graduate School of Management, Professor, 大学院・地域マネジメント研究科, 教授 (30109144)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
ZENG Dao-zhi Kagawa University, Graduate School of Management, Associate Professor, 大学院・地域マネジメント研究科, 助教授 (60284345)
GUO Peijun Kagawa University, Faculty of Economics, Associate Professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (60325313)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2004
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2004)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
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| Keywords | Conflict / Graph model / Shapley value / Possibility theory / Bidding / Second price system / Fairness / Cost sharing / ネットワーク / 可能性情報 / 最適発注量 / ライフサイクル |
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| Research Abstract |
Our research focuses on the resolution of conflicts theoretically and practically. The multilateral conflict aspects are considered. Our approaches are based on possibility theory, bidding theory, cooperative game theory and graph models.
Fair cost sharing of network maintenance is analyzed. It is shown that the Shapley values of cooperative game theory give a rational resolution of the problem. We give a definition of characteristic function of network structure then define the Shapled values on it. They can be calculated very easily. The idea is applied to the actual situation, maintenance of railway network by the local governments, and we show that theoretical result is similar to the actual situation.
Applying the graph model to the conflict resolution, we propose a new way of policy analysis. It is shown that the important thing about the refinement is limited to the stakeholders' direct interests.
We also consider the bidding problem of the public construction. It is pointed out that under an uncertainty such as ground condition the expected values are not appropriate for both governments and builders. We propose a new bidding system that does not use the expected values as payoffs. Our bidding system is designed by using the second price bidding system.
We formalize the uncertainty of demand by possibility distribution, then propose a new decision models. By our new decision model we can determine the optimal order quantity of the short life cycle goods.
We have proposed several ways of conflict resolutions that can be applied to the actual situations. It is expected that these will be applied to many real conflicts.
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