| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
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| Research Abstract |
In 1960, the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court made a judgment concerning constitutional procedural guarantees for conducting "public adversarial rulings" relating it to the "right to trial." This Supreme Court decision should be changed for the following reasons. In the early cases of the Supreme Court, non-adversarial cases were "withheld from normal litigation procedure," however, at present, a "right to trial" is decided on the grounds of whether or not "it is purely adversarial (or litigious)." There has been criticism concerning this reasoning. Recently, experts in the field of family court proceedings argue that the Supreme Court's reasoning fails in regard to non-adversarial cases categorized as "Otsu-type" within the Family Court Law since, "civil litigation, neither theoretically nor in reality, functions in dispute resolution to establish rights and obligations under substantive law."
Furthermore, in terms of the categories of litigation/non-adversarial cases and rulings/tempo
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rary procedures, divisions can be made in the following categories : (a)litigation equals rulings procedure ; (b)litigation equals temporary procedures ; and (c)non-adversarial cases equal temporary procedures. The Grand Bench decision in 1960 only included the categories of (a) and (c) and did not seem to have (b) in mind. However, the category of (b) includes "temporary orders" which play a significant role in both civil litigation as well as administrative litigation. Since case theory orders oral arguments or ex parte hearings only in exceptional cases, the (b) category in general has never been examined from a constitutional perspective. Therefore, there may be a need to consider a constitutional perspective for the categories of (b) and (c). In other words, if the concept of "trial" in Article 32 of the Constitution is interpreted to be wider than that of Article 82, then Article 32 can be interpreted to include other formalities that are not included in "public adversarial rulings." Less
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