| Project/Area Number |
15530114
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University (2004-2005)
Tohoku University (2003) |
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Principal Investigator |
SERIZAWA Shigehiro Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Professor, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (90252717)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Keywords | Strategy-Proofness / Social Choice Function / Pareto-Efficiency / Anonymity / Vickrey Allocation Rule / Uniform Rule / Pure Exchange Economy / Symmetry / Allotoment Economy / インセンティブ / メカニズム・デザイン / 戦略的虚偽表明の防止 |
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| Research Abstract |
We studied strategy-proof allocation rules in the international society where internationally held resource are allocated among counties. We studied allocation rules in two environment. One environment is such that the resource is perfectly divisible and countries have nonmonotonic preferences.
One environment is such that the resource is perfectly divisible and countries have nonmonotonic preferences. In this environment, we analyzed the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982). We established that i)the uniform rule is a unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry on a minimally rich domain, and that ii)the maximal domain on which rules satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry is unique, and it is the signle-plateued domain.
The other environment is such that the resource is not divisible, but monetary compensation is possible. In this environment, we analyzed the Vickrey allocation rule. We established that the Viclrey allocation rule is a unique rule saysfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.
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