| Project/Area Number |
15530185
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
KATAYAMA Seiichi Kobe University, Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Professor, 経済経営研究所, 教授 (70047489)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OHTA Hiroshi Kobe University, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Professor, 国際協力研究科, 教授 (50118006)
TOMIURA Eiichi Yokohama National University, Department of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (40273065)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
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| Keywords | Japanese trade policy / protective policy / tariff policy / free trade policy / Japanese commercial culture / political culture / policy convergnece / Intellectual property Right Protection / 系列企業 / 政治的収斂 / 政策綱領と政治的収斂 / 関税率の競争ゲーム / 政治経済学 / 生産補助金 / 多数決原理 / ロビー活動 / 輸入数量制限 / 均一関税率政策 |
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| Research Abstract |
The main subject of the research is to study endogenous trade-policy formation which captures crucial aspects of the Japanese commercial and political culture. Those trade policies are free trade and protection in terms of import tariff formations. We analyze the influence of the portrayed cultural traits and show that cultural idiosyncrasies are important determinants of trade policy formation ; especially the complex interaction of the two types of cultures is shown to have significant consequence for the policy outcome. Contrasting our model's behavior with the stylized facts of Japanese politics, we arrive at the conclusion that the model's behavior is compatible with the observed (trade) policy positions held by Japanese politicians over the last fifty years. The basic modeling is dynamic endogenous trade policy formation.
By using data obtained from a questionnaire survey to Japanese firms in China, we empirically examine the effects of the Intellectual Property Rights protection against local illegal imitation. No evidence has been found that patent and trade mark registration, which constitutes a part of the IPR protection system, has a protective effect. On the contrary, the results suggests that the patent and trade mark registration system may play a role in facilitating local illegal imitation and may be easing technology transfer/diffusion in China.
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