Framework Design for Deregulated Electricity Market based on the decentralized Simulation Environment
| Project/Area Number |
15560733
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Energy engineering
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| Research Institution | KYOTO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
TEZUKA Tetsuo Kyoto university, Graduate School of Energy Science, Professor, 大学院・エネルギー科学研究科, 教授 (60163896)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2003 – 2004
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2004)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
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| Keywords | Deregulation / Simulation Model / Behavior Analysis / Price Spike / Autonomous Decision-Making / シミュレーションモデル |
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| Research Abstract |
The deregulation trend in the electric power market since 1980's is partly due to the anticipation that introducing a pool market boosts the power companies' competitiveness and also lowers the electricity prices. Through California Electricity Crisis, however, it has been well understood that a pool market principle sometimes leads to the investment circumspection and the resultant price fluctuation. In general, power companies in the locally-monopolized market can easily invest in power-generation plants so as to meet the power demand, and the deregulation of the power industry inevitably makes the investment more risky. Furthermore, there have been invented no rules for making sufficient incentives in strategic investment. Stabilization of the power supply under the deregulated power market is an important requirement for the deregulated framework of the power market.
This study aims to develop a simulation model of the deregulated power market and to propose the design method for the appropriate market rules that can stabilize the power prices. The market mechanism for the liberalized market needs to stabilize the market under variety of decision-making algorithms of stakeholders. However the strict market rules prevent stakeholders from joining the trading. The proposed design method may avoid the undesirable unstable behavior under the prepared decision-making algorithm-sets. The market rule is decided so that the desirability indicator such as the stability of the market price may be maximized. The effectiveness of the proposed method was demonstrated through the simulation study.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
