| Budget Amount *help |
¥15,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥12,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,660,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We studied allocation rules of indivisible goods allocation models focusing on auction models and matching models. Instead of restricting specific candidates of allocation rules a priori, we started with a broad class of allocation rules, and investigated allocation rules satisfying desirable conditions (such as efficiency and fairness) as much as possible in the class. Then, we showed that the minimum price Walrasian rule has excellent properties. We also conducted experiments to come up with ideas that make theoretically desirable allocation rules function well when used in the real societies.
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