| Project/Area Number |
15H03349
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
海老名 剛 明治大学, 商学部, 准教授 (00579766)
北村 紘 京都産業大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (30582415)
篠原 隆介 法政大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (40402094)
水野 倫理 神戸大学, 経済学研究科, 准教授 (60589315)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
ISHIBASHI Ikuo 龍谷大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (30365035)
MIZUNO Keizo 関西学院大学, 商学部, 教授 (40229703)
SHIMIZU Daisuke 学習院大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10396898)
ZHAO Laixun 神戸大学, 経済経営研究所, 教授 (70261394)
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| Research Collaborator |
CHEN Zhijun モナシュ大学, 経済学部, 准教授
CHOE Chongwoo モナシュ大学, 経済学部, 教授
KING Stephen モナシュ大学, 経済学部, 教授
MACHO-STADLER Inés バルセロナ自治大学, 経済経済史学部, 教授
PAN Cong 大阪大学, 経済学研究科
SATO Misato ジョージワシントン大学, 経済学研究科
YOSHIDA Shohei 大阪大学, 経済学研究科
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥8,580,000 (Direct Cost: ¥6,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,980,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
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| Keywords | 競争政策 / 産業組織 / 垂直取引 / 応用ミクロ経済学 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Theoretical economic analysis is indispensable to understand the impact of economic activities under vertically related markets on economic welfare. We mainly analyzed many market environments with vertical relations, which contributes to the discussion on competition policy. Throughout the project, the bargaining powers of agents in each market environment substantially influence the predicted outcomes. For instance, under a bilateral monopoly market with a manufacturer and a retailer, the manufacturer opens its direct distribution channel to improve its disagreement payoff if its bargaining power over the retailer is not sufficiently strong. The effect of the opening on economic welfare depends on the efficiency of the direct distribution channel. When the retailer and the direct distribution channel compete in quantity, the opening harms economic welfare if the efficiency of the direct distribution channel is slightly worse than that of the retailer.
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