| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Governments, as buyers of public goods, often choose suppliers using procurement auctions. In many countries, governments tend to use the scoring auction format rather than the price-only auction. At scoring auctions, the participant with the lowest score, which is calculated from the submitted price and the quality level, wins the project contract. We proposed an empirical model that covers various kinds of scoring auctions. The data used in our empirical illustration contain the bid results of procurement auctions for civil engineering projects by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLIT) in Japan.
We also study the econometric model for identifying the distribution of bidders' private signals from bid data with unobserved heterogeneity. We conduct an empirical study using the data of online auctions.
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